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This brief highlights key features of the political landscape that affect the prospects 
for and the outcomes of agricultural commercialisation in Tanzania1 . It contends 
that the evolving nature of Tanzania’s ruling party, Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM), 
helps to explain observed agricultural policy and performance and sheds light on 
the current and potential future trajectory of agricultural commercialisation in the 
country. The brief focuses on the presidency of Jakaya Kikwete (2005 to 2015) and 
the transition to the presidency of John Magufuli, who succeeded him in 2015.
Changes within Tanzania’s ruling party 
Since independence in 1961, CCM has held power continuously and the party’s 
dominant position is a defining feature of Tanzania’s political system. However, 
during its tenure, the character of the party has changed considerably, from a 
disciplined socialist party under founding President Nyerere, to a pragmatic (but 
often fractious) collection of people seeking to exercise power in the country under 
President Kikwete. 
In response to the economic crisis in the 1980s, and the challenges presented 
by multi-party electoral competition since the 1990s, CCM opened itself up to 
commercial interests who advocated a greater role for the private sector in the 
economy, in exchange for election contributions to the party. Given Tanzania’s 
history to that point, many of them were interested primarily in trading. Following 
two salutary election results, under the current President Magufuli, the party is 
being reshaped with renewed emphasis on domestic production and hints of 
economic nationalism harking back to the Nyerere era. To try and effect these 
changes, Magufuli is recentralising power within the party and restricting political 
space in the country as a whole.
CCM rule and agricultural policy
CCM has not maintained its dominance through high-quality governance and 
service delivery, but rather through an unchallenged ability to fight elections. The 
primary factors contributing to this include the party’s:
1  This focuses on agricultural commercialisation and policy on Tanzania’s mainland. Agricultural  
 policy is designed and implemented separately on the semi-autonomous islands of Zanzibar.
Brief overview
 ● The ruling party, CCM, has maintained 
its dominance primarily through an 
unchallenged ability to fight elections. 
 ● Social services and, since 2015, 
infrastructure investment have been 
accorded higher priority than agricultural 
development; political rhetoric around 
agricultural policy has often not been 
matched by delivery.
 ● Medium- and large-scale farms acquired 
greater prominence during the tenure of 
President Kikwete. Medium-scale farms 
now occupy five times as much land as 
large-scale farms and have emerged 
in response to expanding market 
opportunities. Successive initiatives 
(including the Agricultural Sector 
Development Strategy and Kilimo Kwanza) 
have not recognised any fundamental 
competition between small-, medium- and 
large-scale farms. 
 ● The experience of sugar, rice and cotton 
under President Kikwete illustrate the 
influence of trading interests within CCM. 
President Magufuli is placing renewed 
emphasis on domestic production, but 
inherited power structures pose a challenge 
for initiatives to promote domestic 
productive capacity in agriculture. 
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1. Superior financial position as a consequence of the country’s 
electoral rules and the incorporation of business people into the 
party since the 1990s;
2. Superior organisational capacity, with each village having a CCM 
branch and successive tiers of organisation at ward, district, 
regional and national levels;
3. History of embracing all ethnicities and religions, a direct result 
of President Nyerere’s policies;
4. Self-sustaining dynamic and pervasive presence in rural areas. 
Major gains made by the opposition parties in the last two 
elections have come in urban areas. 
Social services have typically been accorded higher priority 
than agricultural development.  Since the Nyerere era, a stream 
of politicised agricultural slogans, including ‘ukulima wa kisasa’ 
(modern agriculture), ‘siasa ni kilimo’ (politics is agriculture) and 
‘Kilimo Kwanza’ (‘agriculture first’), have tended to substitute for 
effective policy rather than motivate it.
Agricultural policy under President Kikwete
From the outset of his presidency in 2001, Jakaya Kikwete 
recognised the political importance of paying attention to 
agriculture. Thus, he intervened in the new Agricultural Sector 
Development Strategy (ASDS) to quadruple the target for 
investment in smallholder irrigation facilities and scaled up the 
National Agricultural Input Voucher Scheme (NAIVS) with assistance 
from the World Bank. He also invited the Gatsby Charitable 
Foundation to work with the Tanzania Cotton Board (TCB) and 
Ministry of Trade and Industries to revitalise the cotton and textile 
industries. 
In 2009, President Kikwete launched Kilimo Kwanza, a vision for a 
more commercialised agriculture sector. One practical expression 
of this vision was the Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of 
Tanzania (SAGCOT), launched in 2010-11. Politics clearly influenced 
these initiatives, visible in the use of the Kilimo Kwanza slogan at 
political rallies during the 2010 election campaign, to the peak 
in NAIVS expenditure during the 2010/11 season, with vouchers 
allocated to as many voters as possible just before the election. 
However, as in previous eras, rhetoric ran ahead of delivery: 
 ● Revised plans for irrigated rice expansion under ASDS did 
not translate into increased coverage on the ground.
 ● Introduction of contract farming into the cotton sector was 
obstructed for several years by opposition from within CCM. 
 ● Agriculture’s share of total public expenditure peaked at 
6.4% in 2009/10 but has since declined, and is significantly 
below the target of 10% that African Heads of State 
committed to achieve in the 2003 Maputo Declaration and 
again at Malabo in 2014. 
Rather than a coherent agricultural policy, there has been a jostling 
of competing interests with a central tension between investment 
in smallholder agriculture (emphasised in ASDS and in attempts to 
revive the cotton sector) and medium- and/or large-scale private 
agricultural enterprises (championed by Kilimo Kwanza and 
SAGCOT). 
Another tension affecting policy implementation in Tanzania 
has been between businesses wishing to invest in agricultural 
production and trading enterprises that profit from the importation 
of agricultural commodities. 
The rise of medium- and large-scale farms
Both medium- and large-scale farms gained prominence during the 
tenure of President Kikwete; one reason for this is that demand for 
food products is growing steadily as a result of increasing incomes 
within urban centres and increasing urbanisation. 
Large-scale farms
The history of large-scale farms in Tanzania includes the unsuccessful 
colonial-era groundnut scheme in the south, and the nationalisation 
in 1967 of the country’s European-owned sisal estates. Many state 
farms from the Nyerere era encountered financial difficulties and 
have subsequently been leased or sold to private investors. An 
early example was the sale of a majority stake in Kilombero Sugar 
Company Limited to Illovo in 1998. However, Tanzania’s 1999 Village 
Land Act gave communities the ability to defend their rights to land 
and this slowed additional land transfer to large-scale investors. 
Many investors in large-scale farms in Tanzania have come from 
Europe, perhaps reflecting the fact that few domestic investors have 
the capacity to manage large-scale farm enterprises. 
Medium-scale farms
Medium-scale farms (5–100 ha in size) occupy five times as much 
land as large-scale farms. There has been a high rate of growth in 
these farms, with an almost 40% increase in the 4 years after the 
international food price spike (i.e. 2008–12). These farms include 
the holdings of wealthier members of traditional smallholder 
communities and new enterprises established by urban-based 
investors, including civil servants, specifically for making money. 
Economic and political dynamics
Both competition and complementarities exist between large- and 
medium-scale farms, and smallholders. With regards to land and 
market access, large- and medium-scale farms are competitors 
with smallholders. Complementarities exist where lobbying on 
policy targets provision of public goods, and protection against 
imports. Large-scale farm owners may negotiate improvements in 
local infrastructure with spill-over benefits for local smallholders. 
Furthermore, large-scale farms may also offer services (credit, input 
provision, technical advice) to smallholders through outgrower 
(contract farming) schemes. 
Medium- and large-scale farms have been promoted to feed rapidly 
growing urban centres and to keep food prices low and stable. The 
narratives of Kilimo Kwanza and SAGCOT do not present medium- 
© USAID
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and large-scale farms as being in competition with smallholders. 
Experience during the Kikwete era gave cause to doubt the capacity 
of the government to deliver the infrastructure investment and 
support services necessary for smallholder agricultural growth. 
Meanwhile, medium-scale farms represent the response of 
numerous citizens of above-average, but not necessarily large, 
means to expanding market opportunities.  
Land acquisition
In Tanzania, around 70% of land is designated as ‘village land’, vested 
in the village council and allocated to community members for their 
use. That which is not allocated to individuals remains common land. 
There is, however, a long history of tension between the state and 
communities over control of land rooted in the claim that all land 
is ultimately vested in the state. There are various procedures by 
which villages can grant portions of their village land to outsiders. 
The rapid rise of medium-scale farms since 1999 demonstrates 
that these procedures are not an impediment to urban-based 
Tanzanian investors. By contrast, some believe that these procedures 
are unduly cumbersome for large-scale and particularly foreign 
investors. This was one reason behind the drafting of a new 
Land Policy, which commenced in 2016, that seeks to protect 
communities’ rights over land while also streamlining procedures for 
land acquisition for large-scale investment. 
Contested policy narratives around agricultural 
commercialisation
Rationales for stimulating greater commercial investment in 
agriculture vary. Donors have formally championed it as a means 
of reducing poverty in rural areas, although critics argue that 
they are more interested in leveraging new market opportunities 
for agribusinesses and multinational corporations based in their 
countries of origin. Tanzanian business interests promoting the 
vision of medium- and large-scale farms growing alongside 
smallholders are focused on providing opportunities for 
entrepreneurially-minded Tanzanians.
Agricultural Sector Development Strategy (2001)
This donor-friendly document set out a limited vision for the 
Tanzanian state so as to create space for greater commercial 
private sector participation. Objectives were framed in terms of 
poverty reduction, food security and economic growth, to be 
achieved via commercialisation and enhancing productivity. The 
strategy involved taking advantage of domestic and export market 
opportunities, under-utilised land and labour-saving technologies. 
Trade-offs between supporting smallholders and developing large-
scale agriculture were not recognised, but rather the ASDS noted the 
potential for smallholders to benefit from collaboration with large-
scale farms and agribusinesses.
Disincentives to commercial investments in agriculture that were 
identified included restrictions on cross-border trade, the tax regime 
in agriculture, high interest rates on commercial bank loans to 
agriculture, high energy prices and the lack of legal and physical 
access to land. The envisaged role of the public sector was to create 
a stable macroeconomic environment and to provide services to 
smallholders. However, this fairly limited role was not reflected in 
legislative and institutional frameworks, and in particular in the 
broad mandates of commodity boards which were insufficiently 
accountable to value chain stakeholders. Disagreements over the 
roles of the state and the private sector resurfaced during the 
preparation of the Agricultural Sector Development Programme 
(ASDP) launched in 2006. 
Kilimo Kwanza (2009)
This populist document was developed under the auspices of 
the TNBC (a forum for public-private dialogue) with the active 
involvement of the Agricultural Council of Tanzania (ACT). It 
was partly a response by the Tanzania business community to 
the state-led nature of the ASDP. In tandem with dramatic rises 
in world food prices, the initiative supported the principle of 
domestic agricultural production rather than imports — using tariff 
protection if necessary — and argued for investment in domestic 
agro-processing industries and against the export of agricultural 
raw materials. The policy argued that the agricultural sector needed 
to be modernised and commercialised as a precondition for wider 
structural transformation of the economy. It recognised the role 
of input supply companies in countering the low use of improved 
seeds, fertilisers and crop protection chemicals, as well as the need 
to revive the local supply of agricultural implements and machinery. 
It also provided impetus to the establishment of the Tanzanian 
Agricultural Development Bank in 2015.  
Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania (2010–11)
SAGCOT is a public-private partnership that seeks to “ensure 
the necessary policy environment, infrastructure and access to 
knowledge to create an efficient agricultural value chain”. The 
initiative covers around one third of the country and seeks to 
attract both domestic and international investment into agricultural 
production, and is the preeminent initiative for promoting 
large-scale farming. At the same time, SAGCOT aims to include 
smallholders and other rural households through employment 
opportunities and contract farming. 
Tanzania Agriculture and Food Security Investment Plan (2011)
TAFSIP was developed in accordance with the Comprehensive Africa 
Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP). The ASDP was 
subsumed under the TAFSIP in order to satisfy criteria for a CAADP 
investment plan. 
© John Thompson
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Insights from rice, sugar and cotton
Case studies of rice, sugar and cotton commodity chains in Tanzania 
present a diversity of experience with regard to the relative 
importance of central government and sub-national (regional 
and district) administrations in decision-making and influence 
over policy outcomes. The differences reflect the nature of the 
commodity chains and, specifically, the ability of major private 
sector actors to provide services to smallholder suppliers without 
state support.
Rice
Rice is Tanzania’s third-largest crop by volume, and is the most 
commercialised of the country’s staple food crops. In the case of 
both rice and cotton, policy is formally set by central government, 
but formal rules and informal practice have often diverged. 
With rice specifically, state agencies have been directly involved 
in the development of irrigation infrastructure for smallholder 
producers — evidenced in the ASDS initiative outlined above, 
which was, ultimately, a failure. The decentralisation of power in 
Tanzania means that the responsibility for policy implementation 
has fallen to district administrations — who have exercised this 
responsibility with little effective control. It has also been noted that 
this new independence is more the result of the growing holding 
power of local political elites, than the formal provisions of the 
decentralisation policy.
Sugar
Production is centred in four large-scale estates in Morogoro 
region, Kilimanjaro and Kagera. According to one study, more 
than 20,000 smallholder outgrowers supplied around 40% of cane 
to the factories at Kilombero and Mtibwa, although reliance on 
smallholders is declining in Mtibwa. A growing number of medium-
scale farmers also sell sugar to these factories — offering an instance 
of direct competition for production between smallholder and 
medium-scale producers. However, a number of smallholders have 
profited from the rise of medium-scale cane producers, to whom 
these smallholders have leased their land.
Key decisions affecting the profitability of sugar production 
(including import tariffs, import volumes, and commodity pricing) 
are negotiated at the national level. Village councils are involved in 
the land allocation process, but local government plays very little 
role in service provision to sugar farmers. An influx of urban-based 
farmers — who have assumed prominent positions within grower’s 
associations — has given the grower’s associations a greater degree 
of bargaining power with government and companies than is found 
in most Tanzanian commodity chains. Smallholders will continue to 
benefit from this so long as their interests match up with those of 
the new, well-placed medium-scale farmers.
Cotton
From 2008, the Tanzania Cotton Board (TCB) and the Cotton Sector 
Development Programme (CSDP) sought to introduce contract 
farming into the sector in order to provide farmers with technical 
advice, as well as access to credit, which could be used to purchase 
improved seeds and agrochemicals. The initiative was generally 
welcomed by farmers, but was contested by some politically well-
connected cotton buying companies and buying agents (many of 
whom were councillors within district councils) who feared that 
they would lose out from the change. At national level their cause 
was championed by a powerful Minister of Agriculture. The result 
was that other cotton buying companies could never be sufficiently 
assured of a return on their investment to fully commit to contract 
farming. As with smallholder rice irrigation, this case represents 
a failure to implement a policy that had the public backing of 
President Kikwete.
In the first couple of years of the government of President Magufuli, 
it seemed that buying companies would at last receive some 
investment guarantees through formal contracts signed with district 
councils and championed by District and Regional Commissioners. 
However, in 2018 the Prime Minister announced that responsibility 
for cotton buying would instead be returned to agricultural 
marketing cooperatives, as happened prior to liberalisation in 1994.
Reflections on agricultural policy processes 
The relative importance of central government and sub-national 
(region and district) administrations in decision-making varies. These 
differences reflect the ability of major private actors to achieve 
coordination in service provision to smallholder suppliers without 
support from the state. 
In the case of sugar, where there has been an influx of medium-scale 
farmers, land is allocated by village councils, but local government 
plays a very limited role in service provision to sugar farmers. 
However, owing to the perishability of harvested sugar cane, farmers 
have to sell to the nearby processing factory, which facilitates 
contract farming so that farmers can access inputs and services 
on credit. At national level, the profitability of sugar production is 
affected by: 1) the tariff levied on imported sugar; 2) the amount 
of sugar that is imported, and 3) the pricing formula for sugar cane 
which is negotiated across companies and growers’ associations. 
In the case of rice and cotton, policy is formally set by central 
government, although this has often been at odds with informal 
practice. With rice, this was manifested by uncertainty over import 
volumes and tariffs plus export taxes. Local government authorities 
were given responsibility for developing irrigation infrastructure 
for smallholders, but rarely delivered on this. By contrast, in 
cotton, regional and district commissioners for a time assumed an 
increasing role in policy experimentation. They commanded limited 
technical resources, but could play a key role in enforcing loan 
repayment in contract farming arrangements. 
© The White Ribbon Alliance
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The role of donors, farmer organisations and business 
associations
Donors continue to make an important contribution to the national 
budget in Tanzania and are also actively involved in policymaking. 
However, the divergence of policy implementation and formal policy 
constrains the influence that donors can exert over policy in practice. 
In terms of farmer organisations, sugar has attracted the interest of 
well-connected urban-based farmers who have assumed prominent 
positions within growers’ associations, giving them a degree of 
bargaining power with government and companies. In cotton, there 
is a history of cooperative involvement, although primary societies 
and cooperative unions have been unable to compete with private 
buyers in a liberalised market. Business associations have not 
featured in the accounts of any of the three commodities, although 
TNBC and ACT have played a role in developing Kilimo Kwanza and 
supporting SAGCOT. 
Going forward
The commodity case studies above highlight the systemic 
challenges that confronted attempts to deliver palpable results 
in agriculture during the government of President Kikwete. The 
dispersal of power within CCM had given rise to a wide range of 
individuals and groups with claims of influence over the state, which 
also included the power to resist reforms that sought to curtail that 
same power.
In 2015, President Magufuli campaigned on a promise of better 
service delivery and increased employment opportunities for the 
majority of Tanzania’s citizens, made possible by tackling endemic 
corruption within the country. Much of his campaign focused on 
promoting industrialisation in order to generate employment 
and expand domestic production, thereby reducing dependence 
on imports. This was a politically risky move, given CCM’s close 
relationships with trading interests.
The President’s vision, therefore, requires a restructuring of power 
relations in the country, and specifically within CCM. To achieve 
this he has sought to re-centralise decision-making and policy 
implementation processes within CCM. Perhaps to avoid fighting 
battles on multiple fronts at once and/or to reduce exit options 
for disaffected individuals within the party, he has simultaneously 
imposed severe restrictions on the media and opposition parties.
In relation to the commodities discussed in this brief, Magufuli 
has championed domestic sugar processors by restricting import 
volumes, while upholding the tariff on rice imports. The strength 
of his support for the Prime Minister’s recent attempt to restore 
agricultural marketing cooperatives to the heart of the cotton 
industry remains to be seen. However, as elsewhere in the economy, 
the signals for private investors are at best mixed.
At the same time, public funds for direct agricultural investment are 
extremely limited as the overall financial position of the government 
is tight and the overwhelming expenditure priority of the Magufuli 
government is infrastructure. In the 2018/19 budget presented to 
Parliament in June 2018, agriculture was presented as a top priority 
sector, but the budget allocation to the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Livestock, and Fisheries was only 0.85% of the national total.
Agricultural commercialisation is driven by rising demand for 
agricultural products. In Tanzania this is reinforced by measures 
to protect domestic producers against imports. Some of the 
government’s infrastructure investment should also benefit farmers 
and traders seeking to get their produce to market. Offset against 
this are the mixed signals for private investors and the very limited 
public expenditure on agricultural services, which will primarily 
disadvantage smallholder producers. The speed of agricultural 
commercialisation and who is able to benefit from it thus remain to 
be seen.
Note: for more detail on the issues highlighted in this brief, see the 
full APRA working paper: Poulton, C. (2017) APRA Policy Processes and 
Political Economy: Tanzania Country Review APRA Working Paper 5, Future 
Agricultures Consortium  available at https://www.future-agricultures.org/
apra/#aprapublications
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Cover – Lushoto, Tanzania.
Page 2 – Bahati Malekela, farmer and group leader at a rural farm near the Tanzanian village of Idodi, displays tomatoes ready for distribution 
to a market nearby.
Page 3 – Displaying the different grains being sold in a Tanzanian market.
Page 4 – A women’s group meeting in Tanzania.
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